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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eugenio Caliz-Bautista appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen.
Caliz-Bautista argues the district court abused its discretion when it granted the
state’s motion to exclude his expert’s testimony because the expert testimony
was speculative and would not assist the jury.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
E.M. was eleven years old and in the fifth grade. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 167,
Ls. 4-7.) Caliz-Bautista was dating E.M.’s mother. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 143, Ls. 817.) E.M. was at home taking care of the younger kids. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 168, L. 8
– p. 170, L. 6.) E.M. was in her bedroom when Caliz-Bautista knocked on the
door and started talking to her. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 170, L. 7 – p. 173, L. 9.) E.M.
tried to close the door so he could not come in, but Caliz-Bautista pushed the
door open. (Id.) E.M. went to the other side of her bedroom, but Caliz-Bautista
followed her. (Id.) E.M. was scared. (Id.)
Caliz-Bautista pushed E.M. towards her bed. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 177, L. 19 –
p. 182, L. 6.) Caliz-Bautista then checked to see if anyone was coming and shut
the bedroom door. (Id.) He pushed E.M. down on the bed. (Id.) He started
talking off E.M.’s clothes. (Id.) E.M. told him, “No.” (Id.) Caliz-Bautista took off
his pants and started touching E.M.’s vagina with his hands and with his penis.
(Id.) He also licked E.M.’s breast. (Id.)
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Caliz-Bautista stopped when he got a phone call. (Id.) When Caliz-Bautista left
the room, he told E.M. that they would do it again. (Id.)
When E.M. saw that Caliz-Bautista went outside the house, she locked
the doors and windows and called her older sister, Erika. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 182,
L. 23 – p. 184, L. 3.) Caliz-Bautista tried, but could not get back into the house.
(5/18/16 Tr., p. 184, Ls. 8-21.) E.M. told Erika to come home because CalizBautista was making her do things she did not want to do. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 182,
L. 23 – p. 184, L. 3.) E.M. was crying. (Id.) Erika called their mother and the
police. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 184, Ls. 4-7.) The state charged Caliz-Bautista with lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age and sexual abuse of a child
under the age of sixteen years. (R., pp. 58-59.)
As part of the investigation, the state collected DNA evidence. (See R.,
pp. 182-185.) The DNA analysis found that saliva recovered from E.M.’s breast
matched Caliz-Bautista’s DNA. (Id.) The district court granted Caliz-Bautista’s
motion to appoint a DNA expert and appointed Dr. Hampikian. (See R., pp. 7687, 89-94, 183.)
The state served discovery requesting that Caliz-Bautista provide a written
summary or report of Dr. Hampikian’s opinions and the facts and the data he
used in formulating those opinions. (See R., pp. 115-116.) Caliz-Bautista did
not provide a report, but instead provided a paragraph stating that Dr. Hampikian
would testify about lab protocols and about the possibility of contamination. (See
R., pp. 117-118.)
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The state filed a Motion in Limine Re: DNA Opinion and a Motion in
Limine Re: Lab Protocols seeking to exclude Dr. Hampikian from testifying
because his proposed testimony was speculative and unsupported by facts.
(See R., pp. 120-123, 128-135.)

The state argued that Dr. Hampikian’s

“testimony is speculative, conjecture and unsupported by any facts and
accordingly would not be of assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict.
Defendant’s proffered expert did not visit the Idaho State lab, has not observed
the operations and procedures utilized by said lab’s personnel, did not conduct
any independent tests on any of the DNA samples collected in this case, and
was not present to observe the testing of the DNA in this case.” (See id.)
The state also filed a Motion in Limine to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s
testimony because Caliz-Bautista failed to provide a written summary or report of
Dr. Hampikian’s opinion as required by the Idaho Rules of Evidence and the
discovery rules. (See R., pp. 124-125, 128-135.)
The state supported its motions with affidavits and documents showing
that there was no factual basis for Dr. Hampikian’s assertion that samples were
“open” at the same time. (See R., pp. 149-154, 157-173.) Instead of producing
a report of Dr. Hampikian’s opinion, and a factual basis for that opinion, counsel
for Caliz-Bautista listed the topics on which Dr. Hampikian may testify.
(R., pp. 138-148.) Caliz-Bautista filed supplemental expert witness disclosures
which attached some of the state lab documents with some portions highlighted.
(R., pp. 175-181, 191-193.)

The state filed another affidavit and objection

explaining that there was no way to determine how highlighted portions of the lab
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documents supported the proposed offer of proof. (R., pp. 194-208.) Prior to
trial, the state filed motions in limine again seeking to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s
testimony because Caliz-Bautista still had not provided a report containing
Dr. Hampikian’s opinions. (See R., pp. 238-239.)
During the hearing on the state’s motions in limine, counsel for CalizBautista explained that Dr. Hampikian could not testify within a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty that contamination actually occurred in this case.
(5/9/16 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 16-24.)

Caliz-Bautista admitted that Dr. Hampikian’s

testimony would not be helpful to the jury if Dr. Hampikian could not testify to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that contamination could occur. (5/9/16
Tr., p. 26, Ls. 2-16.) Counsel for Caliz-Bautista also explained the defense was
having trouble communicating with Dr. Hampikian. (5/9/16 Tr. p. 26, Ls. 2-22.)
The district court issued a memorandum decision granting the state’s
motion in limine to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony. (R., pp. 182-189.) The
district court explained that Caliz-Bautista conceded that the defense expert
could not testify that contamination actually occurred. (See R., p. 185.)
The defense seemed to concede that their expert could not testify
to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that contamination of
the DNA samples occurred.
(Id.) The district court also noted that Caliz-Bautista failed to explain the factual
or documentary basis for his expert’s assertion that there was a possibility of
contamination. (See R., p. 187, n. 3.)
Counsel has provided no explanation from the expert as to how this
documentation demonstrates that the samples were open at the
same time in the laboratory and the Court’s review of that
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documentation does not show an explanation on the face of the
documentation itself.
(Id.) Despite holding that Dr. Hampikain’s testimony would not be admissible the
district court provided Caliz-Bautista with a further opportunity to lay foundation
for Dr. Hampikian’s testimony via an offer of proof at trial. (See R., pp. 188-189.)
At trial, E.M. testified that Caliz-Bautista touched her vagina with his
hands, penetrated her vagina with his penis and licked her breast. (5/18/16 Tr.,
p. 177, L. 19 – p. 182, L. 6.) E.M. also testified that Caliz-Bautista grabbed her
vagina, over her clothes, all of the time. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 176, L. 18 – p. 177,
L. 15.) Hilda Ruela, E.M.’s mother, testified that she called Caliz-Bautista and
asked, “What have you done to my daughter?” (5/18/16 Tr., p. 245, L. 10 –
p. 246, L. 21.) Before Ms. Ruela even told Caliz-Bautista what she was talking
about, Caliz-Bautista told her that she was crazy. (Id.) When Ms. Ruela got
home, E.M. was crying and was very scared. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 248, Ls. 2-11.)
Rylene Nowlin, the forensic laboratory manager at the Idaho State Police
(“ISP”) lab, testified. (5/19/16 Tr., p. 399, L. 9 – p. 400, L. 9.) She testified there
was no indication that contamination occurred in this case. (5/19/16 Tr., p. 456,
Ls. 9-14.) She also testified that Caliz-Bautista’s DNA was found on the saliva
sample obtained from E.M.’s left breast. (5/19/16 Tr., p. 429, L. 23 – p. 430,
L. 2.)
Out of the presence of the jury, Dr. Hampikian provided an offer of proof.
Caliz-Bautista

clarified

that

the

defense

was

seeking

Dr. Hampikian’s testimony for impeachment purposes.
Ls. 6-21.)

to

introduce

(5/20/16 Tr., p. 459,

Dr. Hampikian testified that it was his belief, based upon the
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extraction worksheet, that the DNA samples were pulled out of the refrigerator
and the testing of the samples in this case was all done at the same time.
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 462, L. 6 – p. 464, L. 19.) Dr. Hampikian explained that his
concern was that if the unknown DNA sample and the known DNA sample were
out of the refrigerator at the same time there could have been contamination
because they existed in the same space. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 475, L. 22 – p. 476,
L. 9, p. 484, Ls. 10-17.)
However, he conceded that he did not know whether any contamination
had actually occurred and conceded the negative controls did not show any
contamination. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 465, L. 22 – p. 466, L. 8.)
Q. To clarify, Dr. Hampikian, you’re not saying contamination did or
didn’t occur in this case.
A. I can’t say.
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 478, Ls. 18-21.) Dr. Hampikian also conceded that he was not
present in the ISP lab for any of the testing done in this case. (5/20/16 Tr.,
p. 471, L. 25 – p. 472, L. 4.) Nor at any time did Dr. Hampikian observe the
processes used by the ISP lab personnel when they tested DNA. (5/20/16 Tr.,
p. 472, Ls. 5-24.) Nor could he even testify that it was more probable than not
contamination occurred. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, Ls. 9-12.)
THE COURT: So you would not be able to testify on a more
probable than not basis that contamination occurred in this case?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
(Id.)
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Nor could he testify that the ISP crime lab failed to follow proper
procedures. Dr. Hampikian testified that the practices and procedures of the ISP
crime lab manual recommend putting down clean paper and changing gloves
when testing different DNA samples, but he did not have any evidence that these
procedures were not followed in this case. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, L. 13 – p. 481,
L. 19.)
THE COURT: In terms of the clean paper, the changing of gloves,
the cleanliness of the instruments, do you have any information
that those requirements were not followed?
THE WITNESS: I do not.
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 481, Ls. 15-19.) Nor could Dr. Hampikian even testify that when
the samples were out of the refrigerator they were “open” at the same time.
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 484, Ls. 10-17.)
THE COURT: Do you have any information that once the evidence
sample was placed in that tube that that tube was open and not
sealed when the suspect sample was opened for the cutting?
THE WITNESS: The evidence would be that they were out at the
same time. I have no proof that they were open at the same time, if
I’m using the terms correctly.
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 484, Ls. 10-17.)
After considering Dr. Hampikian’s offer of proof, the district court
determined that Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony was inadmissible. (See
5/20/16 Tr., p. 540, L. 23 – p. 542, L. 21.)

The district court found

Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was “speculative at best,” “would only invite
conjecture,” and “would not be of assistance to the jury.” (5/20/16 Tr., p. 536,
L. 9 – p. 542, L. 21.) The district court also found that Caliz-Bautista’s expert
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disclosures failed to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 16 and the Rules of
Evidence. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540, L. 9.) The district court granted
the state’s motion in limine to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony.
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 542, Ls. 13-21.)
The jury found Caliz-Bautista guilty of sexual abuse of a child under the
age of sixteen, but found him not guilty of lewd conduct. (R., p. 338; 5/20/16 Tr.,
p. 580, Ls. 5-18.)

The district court entered judgment and sentenced Caliz-

Bautista to 15 years with five years fixed. (R., pp. 356-359.) Caliz-Bautista
timely appealed. (R., pp. 363-367.)
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ISSUE
Caliz-Bautista states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err, and violate Caliz-Bautista’s constitutional
right to present evidence in his defense, when it prevented
Dr. Hampikian from testifying because contamination had been
placed into issue by the State?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Caliz-Bautista failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony
because his proposed testimony was speculative and would not assist the jury?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Determining That
Dr. Hampikian’s Proposed Testimony Was Based Upon Speculation And
Would Not Assist The Jury
A.

Introduction
Dr. Hampikian did not have any evidence that any contamination occurred

in this case. (See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 478, Ls. 18-21.) Nor could he testify that it was
probable that contamination had occurred. (See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, Ls. 9-12).
Nor could he testify that the ISP lab failed to follow its policies and procedures
for properly handling DNA samples. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, L. 13 – p. 481, L. 19.)
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was speculative, unsubstantiated by facts, and would
not have been helpful to the jury. The district court did not abuse its discretion
when it granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude his testimony.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The decision to allow or exclude expert testimony is within the discretion

of the trial court and will not be set aside absent a showing of abuse of
discretion.” State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d 31, 36 (2001) (citing
State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 875, 908 P.2d 566, 568 (1995); State v. Crea,
119 Idaho 352, 353, 806 P.2d 445, 446 (1991)).
In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, the appellate court
must determine whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one
involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (citing
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State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891, 876 P.2d 587, 589 (1994); State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
C.

Dr. Hampikian’s Proposed Testimony Was Speculative And The District
Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Granting The State’s Motion In
Limine To Exclude His Testimony
During the offer of proof, Dr. Hampikian testified that he did not know if

any contamination occurred. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 478, Ls. 18-21.) He admitted he
could not testify whether it was more probable than not any contamination
occurred. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, Ls. 9-12.) Further, he conceded that he did not
have any evidence that the ISP lab failed to follow proper procedures for
handling DNA samples, such as putting down clean paper and changing gloves
when testing different DNA samples. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, L. 13 – p. 481, L. 19.)
The district court determined that Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony was
inadmissible because it was “speculative at best,” “would only invite conjecture,”
and “would not be of assistance to the jury.” (5/20/16 Tr., p. 536, L. 9 – p. 542,
L. 21.)
On appeal, Caliz-Bautista argues that the district court violated CalizBautista’s fundamental right to present a defense because, he claims,
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was relevant as both substantive evidence and
impeachment evidence.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-15.)

arguments are not supported by the record or the law.
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Caliz-Bautista’s

1.

The District Court’s Determination To Exclude Evidence Is An
Evidentiary Issue, Not A Constitutional Issue

On appeal Caliz-Bautista argues that the district court’s decision to grant
the state’s motion in limine violated his Sixth Amendment right to present
evidence at trial. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-12.) It does not appear that CalizBautista raised this Sixth Amendment constitutional claim before the district
court. (See 5/9/16 Tr., p. 22, L. 20 – p. 27, L. 20; 5/20/16 Tr., p. 542, L. 23 –
p. 543, L. 9; R., pp. 138-148, 191-193.) Because Caliz-Bautista failed to raise
the constitutional claim below, he cannot raise it for the first time on appeal
unless he establishes fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). However, on appeal, Caliz-Bautista has made
no argument asserting or establishing fundamental error.

Therefore his

constitutional claim, raised for the first time on appeal, fails.
Even if his claim is considered, Caliz-Bautista’s constitutional argument is
misplaced.

The district court’s decision to exclude the testimony of

Dr. Hampikian is reviewed under the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

In State v.

Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239-242, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058-1061 (2009), the Idaho
Supreme Court explained that a defendant’s right to present evidence is subject
to the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
As previously stated, this Court adopts an approach which holds
that the Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of all
evidence in the courts of this State.
Id. at 240, 220 P.3d at 1059 (emphasis original); see also State v. Conner,
161 Idaho 502, ___, 387 P.3d 170, 174-175 (Ct. App. 2016).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense is subject to reasonable limitations, and
the rules of evidence must be complied with to assure both fairness and
reliability in the ascertainment of guilt or innocence. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho
520, 523, 81 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2003).
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present evidence is
fundamental; however, this right is subject to reasonable
limitations.
The exclusion of evidence does not impair the
defendant’s right “to present a defense so long as they are not
‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they serve.’” The
exclusion is “unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only
where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused.”
With the exercise of the defendant’s right to present evidence, the
rules of procedure and evidence must be complied with to assure
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt or
innocence.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has determined that excluding
evidence pursuant to evidentiary rules does not violate the Sixth Amendment
right to present a defense so long as the evidentiary rules are not “arbitrary” or
“disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (citations omitted). Caliz-Bautista has not
argued, nor could he show, that the Idaho Rules of Evidence are “arbitrary” or
“disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.”
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that the Idaho Rules of Evidence
“embody the balancing test which safeguards a defendant’s constitutional right to
present a defense along with protection of the state’s interest in the integrity of
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the criminal trial process.” Meister, 148 Idaho at 239-242, 220 P.3d at 10581061.
Meister should be afforded the opportunity to present his complete
and full defense, which includes the presentation of all relevant
evidence in the context of trial pursuant to any limitations of the
Idaho Rules of Evidence.
Id. at 241, 220 P.3d at 1060 (emphasis added).
Caliz-Bautista claims that his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense
fails. As explained above, Caliz-Bautista failed to raise this constitutional claim
before the district court and has failed to argue, let alone establish, fundamental
error on appeal. Further, the right to present a defense is subject to the Idaho
Rules of Evidence and, thus, the question for this Court on appeal is whether the
district court abused its discretion when it granted the state’s motion in limine.
This is an evidentiary question, not a constitutional one.
2.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Determined
That Dr. Hampikian’s Testimony Was Speculative And Not Likely
To Assist The Jury

On appeal, Caliz-Bautista argues the district court erred in requiring
Dr. Hampikian to provide “a definitive and quantifiable expression of risk of
contamination as a prerequisite of admission under I.R.E. 702[.]” (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 11-12.) Caliz-Bautista’s argument fails. The district court did not abuse
its discretion when it found that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was speculative and
not likely to assist the jury.
“Expert opinion must be based upon a proper factual foundation.”
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999). “Expert

14

opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is
inadmissible as evidence under Rule 702.”

Id. (quoting Ryan v. Beisner,

123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 1992)). “An expert opinion that
merely suggests possibilities, not probabilities, would only invite conjecture and
may be properly excluded.” Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho
802, 815, 332 P.3d 714, 727 (2014) (citing Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916,
923, 104 P.3d 958, 965 (2004)).
Here, Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony was speculative, only
suggested possibilities that would invite conjecture, and would not assist the jury.
Dr. Hampikian proposed to testify that there could be a possibility of
contamination because the samples were out of the refrigerator at the same
time. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 462, L. 6 – p. 464, L. 19.) Idaho case law holds that when
an expert purports to only offer a “possibility” without offering any “probabilities”
that expert’s testimony is speculative.
In Bromley v. Garey, supra, Garey’s shotgun fell onto the bed of the
pickup, discharged and injured Bromley. 132 Idaho at 809, 979 P.2d at 1167.
Bromely sued Garey. Id. Bromley had a gun expert examine the shotgun. Id.
The gun expert “observed that when the bolt was slammed shut or when the
shotgun was hit on its butt or on the sides, it would fire ninety percent of the
time.”

Id.

The gun expert formulated several different possibilities why the

shotgun discharged. Id. In response to a summary judgment motion, Bromley
sought to have the gun expert’s opinions regarding the shotgun admitted into
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evidence. Id. at 811, 979 at 1169. The district court excluded the gun expert’s
opinion because it was speculative and lacked the proper factual foundation. Id.
The Court of Appeals agreed. Id.
The Court of Appeals held that the gun expert’s opinion was speculative,
because the gun expert never actually took the shotgun apart and he only
suggested different possibilities and never indicated which possibility he thought
actually occurred or was the most probable. Id. at 811-812, 979 at 1169-1170.
[The gun expert] examined the shotgun shortly after the accident.
He observed that the shotgun fired when the bolt was slammed
shut and when the shotgun was hit on the butt or on the sides, but
never took the gun apart or performed anything other than an
external examination. Based on his observations, [the gun expert]
stated several possible reasons for the malfunction: a bad shear
pin, a loose screw, a bad spring, flakes of unburned powder, a
weed or stick, or “countless things.” [The gun expert] never
indicated which of these possibilities he thought had occurred or
even said which was most probable. [The gun expert] merely
recited several things that would be consistent with his
observations.
Given the lack of an internal examination and the purely
speculative nature of [the gun expert’s] testimony, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit [the gun expert’s]
opinions.
Id.
Here, Dr. Hampikian did even less examination than the gun expert in
Bromley. Dr. Hampikian did not visit the lab, nor did he talk to the workers at the
lab, nor did he have any idea what the lab workers actually did when they were
testing the DNA sample.

Further, like the gun expert, Dr. Hampikian only

discussed possibilities and did not provide not testimony about what actually
occurred or even what most probably occurred.
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Dr. Hampikian made errors similar to those made by the expert in Nield v.
Pocatello Health Servs., Inc., supra. In Nield, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
it was error for the district court to not rule on the plaintiff’s objections to
Dr. Coffman’s affidavit.

Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out that

Dr. Coffman’s opinion was unsubstantiated by facts in the record and contained
speculation.

See Id.

Dr. Coffman opined, in part, that contrary to the

handwritten note in the patient’s file, a “MRSA screen” was not performed
because he reviewed the “records available” and did not find a “report of the
[MRSA] screen.” Id. Dr. Coffman’s opinion was based on a “guess” that the
handwritten note was in error. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court stated, “A simple
telephone call to Dr. Zimmerman, the author of the note, might have sufficed to
definitely answer the question.” Id.
The same is true here. Dr. Hampikian looked at the ISP lab records and
guessed that the samples were open at the same time. And as the district court
pointed out, Dr. Hampikian failed to consult with the state lab in preparation of
his testimony. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 542, Ls. 1-4 (“I know of no reason as to why
[Dr. Hampikian] could not have consulted with the state lab in preparation for his
testimony here today, and that did not occur.”).)
In Nield, the expert, Dr. Coffman, also opined as to the potential sources
of infection. 156 Idaho at 814-815, 332 P.3d at 726-727. However, Dr. Coffman
was unable to say whether the patient actually contracted the infection from any
of these possible sources. Id. Dr. Coffman was also unable to show these
possibilities were “founded upon or related to actual facts in the record.” Id.
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The same is true of Dr. Hampikian. Dr. Hampikian only suggested there
was a possibility of contamination because the samples could have been open at
the same time, but then admitted that he did not know whether the samples were
actually open at the same time. (See, e.g., 5/20/16 Tr., p. 484, Ls. 10-17 (“I
have no proof that they were open at the same time, if I’m using the terms
correctly.”).) Dr. Hampikian’s opinion, like that of Dr. Coffman, is speculative and
unsubstantiated by the facts in the record.
In addition, Caliz-Bautista’s argument on appeal, that Dr. Hampikian
should not have been required to provide a quantifiable risk of contamination,
runs counter to his statements to the district court. Counsel for Caliz-Bautista
agreed that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony would not be helpful to the jury if
Dr. Hampikian could not testify to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that
contamination actually occurred. (5/9/16 Tr. p. 26, Ls. 2-16.)
THE COURT: So he’s only going to testify that it is possible that
there was contamination in the case?
MS. DEPEW: That’s correct.
THE COURT: How is that helpful to the jury if he cannot testify to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that contamination did
occur?
MS. DEPEW: And I would agree with that, Judge. And part of the
question I’ve been trying to ask him to fill in that blank, and I don’t
have an answer to, is whether or not, in his opinion, the way this
was done in this case contaminated to the point where re-testing is
not possible, if that’s why he made the decision not to do the retesting, and I haven’t been able to get an answer.
(Id.)
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Further,

Dr.

Hampikian’s

inability

to

quantify

the

likelihood

of

contamination in this case was only one of the reasons the district court excluded
his testimony.

(5/20/16 Tr., p. 540, L. 23 – 542, L. 21.)

After listening to

Dr. Hampikian’s offer of proof, the district court found there were no facts in the
record to support Dr. Hampikian’s opinion regarding potential contamination.
Certainly, after considering the testimony of Dr. Hampikian, it does
appear that there -- in the case that there is no evidence or
testimony that the biological evidence as collected was
contaminated during the collection process. There is no evidence
or testimony that the biological evidence was contaminated during
the biological testing or the amylase process.
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 537, Ls. 7-14.)
But at all times when those items were transmitted, whether they
were or were not transmitted with the sexual assault kit, all of [the]
evidence indicates those items remained sealed. There was no
break in the seal. And certainly there was no evidence in the record
that any contamination occurred during the process of delivery
between law enforcement and the state lab.
(5/20/16 Tr., p. 538, Ls. 8-15.)
Further, the district court found that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was
speculative and unsupported by the facts because his testimony was based
upon an incomplete understanding of the “whole story,” and he did not have any
evidence that the lab violated any of its standards and procedures. (See 5/20/16
Tr., p. 540, L. 23 – p. 542, L. 21.)
Dr. Hampikian himself testified -- or in response to my questions
did testify that he cannot quantify the likelihood of contamination in
this case and cannot say on a more probable than not basis that
contamination occurred in this case. And, certainly, I understand
that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony to be offered is essentially limited to
the records that he has reviewed from the state lab; however, it’s
clear from those records that those records do not tell the whole
story. Certainly, Dr. Hampikian -- I know of no reason as to why he
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could not have consulted with the state lab in preparation for his
testimony here today, and that did not occur.
Dr. Hampikian has indicated some familiarity with the testing
procedures at the state lab, and while I recognize that it’s, perhaps,
not uncommon that other labs may do things differently, that’s not
to suggest that the Idaho State Lab did not perform these tests in
accordance with the standards and processes for which they are
accredited and approved.
And for those reasons, the Court finds, based on the offer of proof,
that the testimony of Dr. Hampikian to be presented is speculative
at best, that that would only invite conjecture, and for that reason,
the Court would find that the testimony of Dr. Hampikian would not
be of assistance to the jury, and the Court would grant the State’s
motion at this time to exclude the testimony of Dr. Hampikian.
(Id.)
Dr. Hampikian’s proposed testimony was speculative, unsubstantiated by
the facts, only suggested possibilities that would invite conjecture, and would not
be helpful to the jury. Caliz-Bautista has failed to show the district court abused
its discretion.
3.

The Testimony Was Not Admissible As Impeachment Evidence

Caliz-Bautista also argues that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony “was relevant
and admissible as impeachment evidence.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-15
(capitalization altered).) Caliz-Bautista argues that Dr. Hampikian’s testimony
was relevant to impeach the state’s experts. (See id.) Caliz-Bautista’s argument
fails.
Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was not relevant to impeach the state’s
witnesses because Dr. Hampikian did not actually have any evidence with which
to contradict the state’s experts. As Dr. Hampikian testified, he did not know if
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any contamination occurred, and he did not know if the state failed to follow the
lab’s policies and procedures. (See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 478, Ls. 18-21, p. 480, L. 13
– p. 481, L. 19.) Therefore, his testimony was not relevant for impeachment
purposes because nothing in his offer of proof would actually contradict or
impeach the testimony of the state’s experts.

Here, as explained above,

Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was speculative, unsubstantiated by facts in the
record, and would not be helpful to the jury.

Even if it was relevant for

impeachment, it would not be admissible. The district court did not abuse its
discretion.
4.

Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion, The Error Was
Harmless

Dr. Hampikian’s testimony was speculative, only suggested possibilities
that invited conjecture, and would not be helpful to the jury. The district court did
not abuse its discretion when it granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude his
testimony. However, even if the district court abused its discretion, that error
was harmless. “A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionallybased error shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which
point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, 245 P.3d at 974. “Where
a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously objected to, this
Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test.”

State v.

Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600-01, 301 P.3d 242, 258-259 (2013) (citation
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omitted). “[T]he error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the
same without the error.” Id. at 598, 301 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted).
Here, the result would have been the same because the district court
would have excluded Dr. Hampikian’s testimony because Caliz-Bautista failed to
comply with disclosure requirements of the Idaho Rules of Evidence and
discovery.

(See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540, L. 9.)

Idaho Rule of

Evidence 705 allows an expert to testify regarding his or her opinion, provided,
that “if requested pursuant to the rules of discovery the underlying facts or data
were disclosed.” I.R.E. 705. Idaho Criminal Rule 16 requires, that upon written
request of the prosecutor, the defense must produce expert witness opinions
and the facts and data for those opinions. I.C.R. 16(c)(4).
The state filed a motion to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony because
Caliz-Bautista failed to provide a written summary or report of Dr. Hampikian’s
opinion as required by the Idaho Rules of Evidence and the discovery requests.
(See R., pp. 124-125, 128-135.) The state explained that Caliz-Bautista’s failure
to comply with the discovery rules resulted in the state’s inability to have its own
expert review the opinion and “the State will be unfairly prejudiced by the late
disclosure of said report.” (R., pp. 124-125; see also R., p. 133 (letter to defense
counsel explaining that late disclosure of Dr. Hampikian’s opinion was risking the
ability of the trial to go forward as scheduled).) The district court agreed that
Caliz-Bautista’s expert witness disclosures failed to comply with the Idaho Rules
of Evidence and Idaho Criminal Rule 16. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540,
L. 9.)

22

Whether to exclude a defense witness for late disclosure is within the
discretion of the trial court. State v. Siegel, 137 Idaho 538, 543, 50 P.3d 1033,
1038 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201,
1205 (1999); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 633, 945 P.2d 1, 4 (1997)). “In
exercising its discretion, ‘the trial court must consider whether the State would be
prejudiced from the late disclosure if the evidence were admitted and weigh that
prejudice against the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’” Id. (citing State v. Thomas,
133 Idaho 800, 802, 992 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct. App. 1999)). The prejudice resulting
from late disclosure may be greater when the witness is an expert. See Siegel,
137 Idaho at 543, 50 P.3d at 1038 (citing State v. Miller, 133 Idaho 454, 457, 988
P.2d 680, 683 (1999)).
The district court ruled that Caliz-Bautista’s expert witness disclosures
regarding Dr. Hampikian did not comply with the Idaho Rules of Evidence and
Idaho Criminal Rule 16. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540, L. 9.) In a footnote,
Caliz-Bautista argues that the district court’s finding that he violated the
discovery rules was not sufficient to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony because
the district court did not make a specific finding as to the potential prejudice to
the state or alternative remedies to exclusion. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14,
n. 2.)

Contrary to Caliz-Bautista’s argument, the district court had sufficient

evidence in the record that his failure to comply with discovery requests
prejudiced the state.
The state moved to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony, in part, on the
grounds the state was unable to properly prepare for trial due to Caliz-Bautista’s
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failure to disclose an expert opinion, and basis for that opinion.
pp. 124-125.)

(See R.,

In its ruling the district court noted that the disclosure

requirements are in place so that a party can properly prepare for trial. (5/20/16
Tr., p. 539, L. 22 – p. 540, L. 9.)
Certainly, under Rule 16, when a discovery request is directed to
expert testimony, the rule specifically requires that the opinions to
be expressed by an expert are to be disclosed, together with the
facts and data upon which the expert relies. And that applies to
both sides so both sides can be prepared to know what the
opinions of an expert are going to be so as both sides may properly
prepare. I would first note that I do believe, in my considered
opinion, that the defense’s disclosures at this time do not comply
with 702, 703, and 705 or within the contemplation of Rule 16.
(Id.) The district court had a basis for finding the state was prejudiced by the
lack of a disclosure.

Thus any error in excluding Dr. Hampikian’s testimony

because it was speculative would have been harmless because Dr. Hampikian’s
testimony would have been excluded for failing to comply with the Idaho Rules of
Evidence and the Idaho Criminal Rules.
Even if Dr. Hampikian’s testimony had ultimately been admitted at trial, it
would not have changed the outcome of the trial.

E.M. testified that Caliz-

Bautista licked her breast. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 177, L. 19 – p. 182, L. 6.) CalizBautista’s DNA was found on the sample obtained from E.M.’s left breast.
(5/19/16 Tr., p. 429, L. 23 – p. 430, L. 2.) Erika, E.M.’s sister, testified that E.M.
was crying and telling her that Caliz-Bautista was making her do things she did
not want to do. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 182, L. 23 – p. 184, L. 3.) E.M.’s mother also
testified that E.M. was crying and was very scared. (5/18/16 Tr., p. 248, Ls. 211.)
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Dr. Hampikian’s testimony would not have changed the jury’s verdict.
Dr. Hampikian admitted that he had no idea if any contamination took place, he
was not present for the testing, he did not observe the processes used by ISP,
he had no evidence that the ISP lab failed to follow its policies and procedures,
and he had no evidence that the DNA samples were even open at the same
time. (See 5/20/16 Tr., p. 465, L. 22 – p. 466, L. 8, p. 471, L. 25 – p. 472, L. 4,
p. 472, Ls. 5-24, p. 478, Ls. 18-21, p. 480, L. 13 – p. 481, L. 19, p. 484, Ls. 1017.) Dr. Hampikian could not even testify that it was more probable than not
contamination occurred. (5/20/16 Tr., p. 480, Ls. 9-12.)
THE COURT: So you would not be able to testify on a more
probable than not basis that contamination occurred in this case?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
(Id.) And, as Caliz-Bautista conceded, if Dr. Hampikian could not testify to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that contamination actually occurred,
then his testimony would not be helpful to a jury. (5/9/16 Tr. p. 26, Ls. 2-16.)
Even if it were error to exclude Dr. Hampikian’s testimony, the error was
harmless.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Caliz-Bautista’s
conviction.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2017.

_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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